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3CORE, Université Catholique de Louvain.
Abstract
When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibria are constrained suboptimal,
which provides a scope for pareto improving interventions. Price regulation can be such a
pareto improving policy, even when the welfare effects of rationing are taken into account.
An appealing aspect of price regulation is that it that it operates anonymously on market
variables.
Fix - price equilibria exist under weak assumptions. Such equilibria permit a compet-
itive analysis of an economy with an incomplete asset market that is out of equilibrium.
Arbitrage opportunities may arise: with three or more assets actively traded, an individual
may hold an arbitrage portfolio at equilibrium.
The local existence of fix - price equilibrium for prices that are almost competitive may
fail for robust examples. Under necessary and sufficient conditions for the local existence
of fix - price equilibria, pareto improving price regulation is generically possible.
Key words: incomplete asset market, fix - price equilibria, pareto improvement.
JEL classification numbers: D45, D52, D60.
1 Introduction
Prices in competitive markets may fail to attain equilibrium; a variety of reasons, such
as institutional constraints on price formation and lags in the adjustment of prices may
underlie this failure. The theory of general competitive equilibrium does not account for
the formation of prices; moreover, empirical evidence indicates the presence of persistent
deviations from market clearing.
The failure of prices to attain market clearing is most plausible as a short - run phe-
nomenon in an economy subject to stochastic shocks and, consequently, with an operative
asset market; the extension of fix - price analysis to such a framework is, thus, pertinent.
Fix - price equilibria, following Bénassy (1975) and Drèze (1975), characterize the
allocation of resources at arbitrary prices. The definition extends to economies with un-
certainty and an incomplete asset market. Under weak assumptions fix - price equilibria
exist.
With the prices of commodities fixed, the distinction between nominal assets, denom-
inated in units of account, and real assets, denominated in one or multiple commodities,
vanishes. The argument for the existence of fix - price equilibria is an adaptation of the
argument for the existence of competitive equilibria for economies with a complete market
in contingent commodities 1 or for economies with assets whose payoffs are denominated
in a numeraire commodity — Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986).
The prices of assets may allow for arbitrage: with three or more assets effectively traded,
an individual may hold an arbitrage portfolio at equilibrium.
When the asset market is complete, competitive equilibrium allocations are pareto
optimal 2. Moreover generically, they are regular: locally, they are unique, and they vary
continuously with the parameters of the economy 3.
When the asset market is incomplete, competitive equilibrium allocations generically
fail to satisfy the criterion of constrained pareto optimality that recognizes the incom-
pleteness of the asset market: there exist reallocations of portfolios that yield pareto
improvements in welfare after spot commodity markets adjust to attain equilibrium —
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986); this is the case, even if the payoffs of assets are
denominated in a numeraire commodity and the set of states of the world is finite, which
allow for the existence and regularity of competitive equilibrium allocations.
The informational requirements of improving interventions can be recovered from the
market behavior of individuals — Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1990), Kübler and
Polemarchakis (1999).
1Arrow and Debreu (1954), McKenzie (1954).
2Arrow (1951, 1953), Debreu (1951, 1960).
3Debreu(1970).
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The failure of constrained optimality casts doubt on the desirability of non - intervention
with competitive markets, such as the laissez faire policy in international trade — Newbery
and Stiglitz (1984). The heterogeneity of individuals and the requirement of anonymity
may interfere with improving interventions — Citanna, Kajii and Villanacci (1998), Kajii
(1994), Mas - Colell (1985 b). Nevertheless, the failure of constrained optimality raises the
possibility of active policy.
Financial innovation, the introduction of new assets, may lead to a pareto deterioration
— of Hart (1975); conditions for pareto improving financial innovation to be possible are
rather restrictive — Hara (1997), Cass and Citanna (1998), Elul (1995).
An alternative to the reallocation of portfolios or financial innovation is the regulation
of prices in spot commodity markets. When the asset market is incomplete, there exist
variations in prices that lead to a pareto improvement over a competitive allocation after
rationing attains market clearing.
The deviation of prices from their competitive equilibrium values can be chosen inde-
pendently of the state of the world 4; thus, price regulation is comparable to the reallocation
of portfolios carried out before the resolution of uncertainty. More importantly, it is anony-
mous. The volume of trade in the markets for assets as well as commodities is endogenously
determined. The information required for the implementation of pareto improving price
regulation is null.
The incompleteness of the asset market makes competitive allocations targets for reg-
ulation; compared with the reallocation of portfolios, the mode of intervention here, price
regulation, has the advantage that it involves only aggregate, market variables, the prices
of commodities: regulation can be decentralized.
Direct antecedants of this result are the argument in Polemarchakis (1979), which
showed that fixed wages that need not match shocks in productivity may yield higher
expected utility in spite of the loss of output in an economy of overlapping generations;
and the argument in Drèze and Gollier (1993), which employed the capital asset pricing
model to determine optimal schedules of wages that differ from the marginal productivity
of labor. An example of pareto improving price regulation was developed in Kalmus (1997).
The desirability of price stability was evoked earlier in the literature of international
trade — Waugh (1944), Howell (1945), Oi (1961, 1972) — where Samuelson (1972 a,
b) raised the issue of feasibility and pointed out that price stabilization can be pareto
improving only if constraints prevent the pareto optimality of competitive allocations. In
a different context, Weitzman (1974, 1977) argued that quantities may dominate prices as
planning instruments; but the argument does not distinguish efficiency from distribution;
4John Geanakoplos insisted on this point. Hamid Sabourian suggested the alternative of state - inde-
pendent quantity constraints.
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even with a complete asset market, a quantity based mechanism may indeed allocate
resources more effectively to “those who need it most.”
Minimum wages and price supports for agricultural products, often advocated and
imposed on grounds of equity, even fixed exchange rates, may be called for on grounds of
efficiency when the asset market fails to price all risks.
2 The Economy
Individuals are i ∈ I = {1, . . . , I}. States of the world are s ∈ S = {1, . . . , S}. Commodities
are l ∈ L = {1, . . . , L + 1}; commodity l in state of the world s is (l, s). A bundle of
commodities in state of the world s is 5 xs = (. . . , xl,s, . . .)′, and a bundle of commodities
across states of the world is x = (. . . , xs, . . .)′.
Individual i is described by his consumption set, X i, the set of consumption plans,
bundles of commodities across states of the world, his utility function, ui, with domain the
consumption set, and by his endowment, ei, a bundle of commodities across states of the
world.
Assets are a ∈ A = {1, . . . , A+1}. A portfolio of assets is y = (. . . , ya, . . .)′. The payoffs
of assets are denominated in the numeraire commodity, (L + 1, s), in every state of the
world. The payoff of asset a in state of the world s is Rs,a; the payoffs of the asset across
states of the world are R·a = (. . . , Rs,a, . . .)′. The payoffs of assets in state of the world s
are Rs· = (. . . , Rs,a, . . .); the payoffs of assets across states of the world are







The asset market is complete if all reallocations of revenue across states of the world are
attainable: the matrix of payoffs of assets, R, has column span of dimension S; otherwise,
it is incomplete.
An economy is
E = ((X i, ui, ei) : i ∈ I, R).




An allocation of commodities is xI = (. . . , xi, . . .), such that xi ∈ X i, for every indi-
vidual; aggregate consumption is xa =
∑
i∈I x
i, and the allocation is feasible if aggregate
5“′”denotes the transpose.
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consumption coincides with the aggregate endowment: xa = ea. An allocation of portfolios
is yI = (. . . , yi, . . .); the aggregate portfolio is ya =
∑
i∈I y
i, and the allocation is feasible
if the aggregate portfolio vanishes: ya = 0. An allocation is (xI , yI), a pair of an alloca-
tion of commodities and an allocation of assets, and it is feasible if both the allocation of
commodities and the allocation of assets are feasible.
Definition 1 An allocation of commodities, xI , pareto dominates another, x̂I, if ui(xi) ≥
ui(x̂i), for every individual, with strict inequality for some. A feasible allocation of com-
modities is pareto optimal if no feasible allocation pareto dominates it.
The price of commodity l in the spot market in state of the world s is pl,s; the price
of the numeraire commodity, (L + 1, s) in every state of the world, is pL+1,s = 1. Prices
of commodities in state of the world s are ps = (. . . , pl,s, . . .), and prices of commodities
across states of the world are p = (. . . , ps, . . .). The domain of prices of commodities is
P = {p : pL+1,s = 1, s ∈ S}.
The price of asset a is qa; the price of the numeraire asset, which, without loss of
generality, can be chosen to be A + 1, is qA+1 = 1. Prices of assets are q = (. . . , qa, . . .).
The domain of prices of assets is Q = {q : qA+1 = 1}.
Commodities other than the numeraire are Ľ = {1, . . . , L}, and assets other than the
numeraire are Ǎ = {1, . . . , A}. With prices of the numeraire deleted, prices of commodities
in state of the world s are p̌s, prices of commodities across states of the world are p̌, and
prices of assets are q̌. The domain of prices of commodities other than the numeraire is P̌ ,
and the domain of prices of assets other than the numeraire is Q̌.
Prices are a pair, (p, q), of prices of commodities and prices of assets; the domain of
prices is P ×Q. With prices of the numeraires deleted, prices are (p̌, q̌), and their domain
is P̌ × Q̌.
At prices of commodities and assets (p, q), the set of non - numeraire commodities Ľ
is partitioned into the subsets of commodities with positive prices, L+, negative prices,
L−, and free commodities, L0; the set of non - numeraire assets Ǎ is partitioned into the
subsets of assets with positive prices, A+, negative prices, A−, and free assets, A0.
An economy with fixed prices, (p, q), is
E(p, q) = ((X i, ui, ei) : i ∈ I, R, (p, q)).
The economy satisfies the following assumptions
• For every individual, the consumption set is the set of non - negative commodity
bundles: X i = {x : x ≥ 0}, the utility function, ui, is continuous, quasi - concave
and weakly monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in every state of
the world: 6 ui(x+ k1(L+1)s,(L+1)S) ≥ ui(x), for all k ≥ 0, and the endowment is an
6“1k,K”denotes the k - th unit vector of dimension K.
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element of the consumption set: ei ∈ X i.
These restrictions on the characteristics of individuals are weak. The matrix of payoffs of
assets and the prices of commodities and assets other than the numeraires are unrestricted.
In commodities and assets other than the numeraire, uniform rationing across individ-
uals serves to attain market clearing.
Rationing in the supply of commodity l in the spot market in state of the world s is zl,s,
for l ∈ Ľ. Rationing in the supply of commodities, other than the numeraire in state of the
world s is zs = (. . . , zl,s, . . . , zL,s)
′, and rationing in the supply of commodities across states
of the world is z = (. . . , zs, . . .)
′. The domain of rationing in the supply of commodities is
Z = {z : zs ≤ 0, s ∈ S}. Rationing in the supply of asset a, is ya, for a ∈ Ǎ. Rationing
in the supply of assets is y = (. . . , y
a
, . . . , y
A
). The domain of rationing in the supply of
assets is Y = {y : y ≤ 0}.
Rationing in the demand for commodity l in the spot market in state of the world s is
zl,s, for l ∈ Ľ. Rationing in the demand for commodities, other than the numeraire, in state
of the world s is zs = (. . . , zl,s, . . . , zL,s)′, and rationing in the demand for commodities
across states of the world is z = (. . . , zs, . . .)′. The domain of rationing in the demand for
commodities is 7 Z = {z : zs ≥ 0, s ∈ S}. Rationing in the demand for asset a, is ya, for
a ∈ Ǎ. Rationing in the demand for assets is y = (. . . , ya, . . . , yA). The domain of rationing
in the demand for assets is Y = {y : y ≥ 0}.
A rationing scheme in commodities is a pair, (z, z), of rationing of supply and rationing
of demand. A rationing scheme in assets is a pair, (y, y), of rationing of supply and rationing
of demand. A rationing scheme is a pair, ((z, z), (y, y)), of rationing in commodities and
rationing in assets.
At prices and rationing scheme (p, q, z, z, y, y), the budget set of individual i is




ps(xs − eis) ≤ Rs·y, s ∈ S,
zl,s ≤ (xl,s − e
i
l,s) ≤ zl,s, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,
y
a
≤ y ≤ ya, a ∈ Ǎ,
x ∈ X i

.
7“,”“>”and “≥”are vector inequalities; also “,”“<”and “≤.”
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The optimization problem of the individual is to
max ui(x)
s.t (x, y) ∈ βi(p, q, z, z, y, y).
The solution to the optimization problem, δi(p, q, z, z, y, y), defines the demand correspon-
dence, δi, of the individual.
Definition 2 (Effective rationing) At prices and rationing scheme (p, q, z, z, y, y), in-
dividual i is effectively rationed in his supply (demand) in the market for commodity (l, s)
if there exists (x, y) ∈ βi(p, q, z′, z, y, y) ( (x, y) ∈ βi(p, q, z, z′, y, y) ), such that ui(x) ex-
ceeds the utility at δi(p, q, z, z, y, y), where z′
l,s




z′l,s = zl,s), for all (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S \ {(l, s)}.
There is effective supply (demand) rationing in the market for commodity (l, s) if at
least one individual is effectively rationed on his supply (demand).
Individual i is effectively rationed in his supply (demand) in the market for asset a if
there exists (x, y) ∈ βi(p, q, z, z, y′, y) ( (x, y) ∈ βi(p, q, z, z, y, y′) ), such that ui(x) exceeds
the utility at δi(p, q, z, z, y, y), where y′
a




(y′a = +∞, while y
′
a = ya),
for all a ∈ Ǎ \ {a}.
There is effective supply (demand) rationing in the market for asset a if at least one
individual is effectively rationed on his supply (demand).
The consumption sets and utility functions of individuals and the matrix of payoffs of
assets are held fixed; an economy is fully described by the allocation of endowments of
individuals: E = eI = (. . . , ei, . . .), and an economy with fixed prices by the allocation of
endowments of individuals and the prices of commodities and assets: E(p, q) = (eI, (p, q)).
The set of economies, Ω, is a bounded, open subset of euclidean space of dimension
I(L + 1)S. An economy is E(ω) = eI(ω) or, simply, ω, and an economy with fixed prices
is E(ω)(p, q) = (eI(ω), (p, q)) or, simply, (ω, (p, q)). A generic set of economies is an open
subset of the set of economies of full lebesgue measure; a property holds generically if it
holds for a generic set of economies.
Definition 3 (Fix - price equilibrium) A fix - price equilibrium for the economy E =
((X i, ui, ei) : i ∈ I, R) at prices (p, q) or, equivalently, a competitive equilibrium for the
economy with fixed prices E(p, q) = ((X i, ui, ei) : i ∈ I, R, (p, q)) is a pair, ((z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗),
(xI∗, yI∗)), of a rationing scheme and an allocation, such that
1. for every individual, (xi∗, yi∗) ∈ δi(p, q, z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗),
2. xa∗ = ea, and ya∗ = 0,
6





























every individual, yi∗a < y
∗




a then, for every




Conditions 1 and 2 are the usual optimization and market clearing conditions. Con-
ditions 3 and 4, together with the convexity of the consumption sets and the quasi -
concavity of the utility functions of individuals, imply that there is no effective rationing,
simultaneously, on both sides of a market: markets are transparent.
Definition 4 (Competitive equilibrium) A competitive equilibrium for the economy
E = ((X i, ui, ei) : i ∈ I, R) is a triple, ((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)), of prices, a
rationing scheme and an allocation, such that
1. for every individual, (xi∗, yi∗) ∈ δi(p∗, q∗, z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗),
2. xa∗ = ea, and ya∗ = 0, and





z∗l,s, and, for every asset other than the numeraire, y
∗
a
< yi∗a < y
∗
a.
In a competitive equilibrium there is no effective rationing in any market if preferences
are convex.
If (p∗, q∗) are competitive equilibrium prices, a fix - price equilibrium at prices (p, q∗)
with p 6= p∗ may require effective rationing in the markets for assets, as well as in the
markets for commodities; this is the case when the prices of commodities are regulated
away from their competitive equilibrium values in order to effect a pareto improvement,
while the prices of assets are held fixed at their competitive equilibrium values.
If ((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)) is a competitive equilibrium for the economy E,
((z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)) is a fix - price competitive equilibrium for the economy E(p∗, q∗);
nevertheless, it is possible that there are fix - price competitive equilibria ((z∗∗, z∗∗, y∗∗, y∗∗),
(xI∗∗, yI∗∗)) such that xI∗∗ is not a competitive equilibrium allocation of commodities —
Madden (1982), for an example in an economy with a complete asset market.
2.1 Arbitrage
An arbitrage portfolio, ŷ, is such that qŷ ≤ 0, while Rŷ > 0. Prices of assets allow for
arbitrage if an arbitrage portfolio exists. Fix - price equilibria exist when prices of assets
7
allow for arbitrage — proposition 3 — but the presence of arbitrage opportunities imposes
restrictions on equilibrium rationing schemes.
Proposition 1 If A ≥ 1 and the utility function of every individual is monotonically
increasing in the numeraire commodity in every state of the world: ui(x+k 1(L+1)s,(L+1)S) >
ui(x), for all k ≥ 0, then, at a fix - price equilibrium, if ŷ is an arbitrage portfolio, there
exists, for every individual, an asset a, other than the numeraire, such that either y∗
a
= yi∗a
and ŷa < 0 or y∗a = y
i∗
a and ŷa > 0.
Proof If, for some individual, i, ŷa ≥ 0 whenever y∗a = y
i∗


















< yi∗a . It follows that, for some λ > 0,
y∗
a
≤ yi∗a +λŷa ≤ y
∗
a, for all a ∈ Ǎ. But then, the pair of a consumption plan and a portfolio
(xi, yi) defined by yi = yi∗+λŷ, xil,s = x
i∗





for all s ∈ S, is an element of the budget set βi(p, q, z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), while ui(xi) > ui(xi∗),
since the utility function is monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in every
state of the world, a contradiction. 2
At a fix - price equilibrium, ((z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)), the market for asset a is closed
if y∗
a
= 0 or y∗a = 0; if the market is not closed, then it is open — the market for asset
A+ 1 is always open. The set of all assets for which markets are open is A◦; the associated
effective prices of assets are q◦, an effective portfolio is y◦, and the matrix of effective payoffs
of assets is R◦. An effective arbitrage portfolio, ŷ◦, is such that q◦ŷ◦ ≤ 0, while R◦ŷ◦ > 0.
Proposition 2 If the utility function of every individual is monotonically increasing in
the numeraire commodity in every state of the world, then, at a fix - price equilibrium for
an economy with at most two assets for which markets are open 8, |A◦| ≤ 2, there is no
effective arbitrage portfolio.
Proof If |Ao| = 1, the argument is trivial.
If |Ao| = 2, there exists a non - numeraire asset a ∈ Ao. If ŷo is an effective arbitrage
portfolio, then either ŷa = 0 or ŷa 6= 0. If ŷa = 0, then q◦ŷ◦ ≤ 0 and R◦ŷ◦ > 0 implies
R·A+1 < 0, and, since individuals do not face constraints in the supply of asset A+1, a fix -





for all i ∈ I, and thus, by market clearing, y∗a = 0 : the market for asset a is not open, a
contradiction. If ŷa < 0, similarly, the market for asset a is not open, a contradiction. 2
The result does not extend to fix - price equilibria with more than two assets for which
markets are open. With three assets and three individuals, it is even possible that, at a fix -
8“| |”denotes the cardinality of a set.
8
price equilibrium, one individual holds an arbitrage portfolio that the other two individuals,
together, supply; which is peculiar and obviously implies the existence of effective arbitrage
portfolios.
An example
Individuals are i ∈ I = {1, 2, 3}; there is only one commodity, the numeraire: l ∈ L = {1}
— the subscript that indicates the commodity is not necessary; states of the world are
s ∈ S = {1, 2, 3}, and there are two assets other than the numeraire: a ∈ A = {1, 2, 3}.
Individuals have utility functions ui = aix1 + bix2 + cix3, x ≥ 0, and endowments





′. For individual 1, (a1, b1, c1) = (2, 1, 2), and e1 = (3, 9, 3)′; for individual
2, (a2, b2, c2) = (1, 2, 2), and e2 = (9, 3, 3)′; for individual 3, (a3, b3, c3) = (1, 1, 2) and
e3 = (5, 5, 5)′.








Prices of commodities and assets are
p = (1, 1, 1), q = (1, 1, 2).
An arbitrage portfolio satisfies
−4y1 + 2y2 − 2y3 ≥ 0,
2y1 − 4y2 − 2y3 ≥ 0,
2y1 + 2y2 + 6y3 ≥ 0,
with at least one strict inequality, and
y1 + y2 + 2y3 ≤ 0.
For λ > 0, the portfolio yλ = (−λ,−λ, λ) is an arbitrage portfolio: Ryλ = (0, 0, 2λ)′ > 0,
while qyλ = 0.
9

















it follows that an individual with a utility function ui(x) = aix1 + bix2 + cix3 solves the
optimization problem
max (−3ai + 3bi − ci)y1 + (3ai − 3bi − ci)y2,




y2 − y1 ≤ 13e
i
2,
y1 + y2 ≤ ei3,
y
1
≤ y1 ≤ y1,
y
2
≤ y2 ≤ y2.
If ((z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)) is a fix - price equilibrium, since, for any λ > 0, yλ is
an arbitrage portfolio, it follows by proposition 1 that all individuals are rationed on the
supply of asset 1 or asset 2. If no individual is rationed in the supply of asset 2, then every
individual is rationed in the supply of asset 1, and market clearing implies that y∗
1
= 0.
Irrespective of rationing in the demand of asset 2, individual 2 supplies 2 units of asset 2
and individual 3 supply 4/3 units of asset 2, whereas individual 1 demands at most 2 units
of this asset, which is a contradiction. Similarly, there is no fix - price equilibrium without
rationing in the supply of asset market 1. Consequently, in every fix - price equilibrium,
there is rationing in the supply of both assets, while there is no rationing in the demand
of any asset. Therefore, without loss of generality, the demand for assets 1 and 2, and,
hence, for asset 3 as well as for commodities, is a function of the rationing scheme on the
supplies of the assets.
If y∗ = (−1,−1)′, y∗ > (2, 2)′ (exact choice does not matter), then x1∗ = (12, 0, 2)′,
x2∗ = (0, 12, 2)′, x3∗ = (5, 5, 7)′, y1∗ = (−1, 2,−1/2)′, y2∗ = (2,−1, −1/2)′, and y3∗ =
(−1,−1, 1)′; this describes the unique fix - price equilibrium, where equilibria are equivalent
if they differ only with respect to non - binding rationing schemes.
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Indeed, the demands of individuals as functions of the rationing scheme on the supplies
are






























































































The unique solution is y = (−1,−1)′.
At the fix - price equilibrium, individuals 1 and 2, together, supply the arbitrage port-
folio that individual 3 holds.
3 The Existence of Fix - price Equilibria
For the existence of fix - price equilibria, it is essential that budget constraints hold with
equality. Either one imposes this condition directly on the budget set, or one makes the
following assumption.
• The numeraire asset is weakly desirable, R·A+1 ≥ 0.
Since the utility functions of individuals are weakly monotonically increasing in the
numeraire commodity while the numeraire asset is weakly desirable, with no loss of gen-
erality, the budget constraints of the individual in the market for assets as well as in the
spot markets for commodities are satisfied with equality.
The effective consumption set of individual i is
X̂ i = {x ∈ X i : xl,s ≤ e
a
l,s, (l, s) ∈ L× S}.
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If xI is a feasible allocation of commodities, then xi ∈ X̂ i, for every individual.
A revenue plan is
w = (. . . , ws, . . .)
′.
Associated with a consumption plan of individual i, x ∈ X i, there is a revenue plan
wi(x) = (. . . , wis(xs), . . .)
′,
where wis(xs) = ps(xs − e
i
s).
The set of effective revenue plans of individual i is
Wi = {w : w = wi(x), for some x ∈ X̂ i}.
The set of effective portfolios of assets of individual i is
Yi = {y : w = Ry, qy = 0, for some w ∈ Wi}.
The sets X̂ i and Wi are compact; not necessarily so for the set of effective portfolios
of assets of an individual, since the matrix of payoffs of assets need not have full column
rank.
3.1 Minimal asset trades
The set of effective feasible allocations of assets for the economy is
YI = {yI ∈ ×i∈IY
i : ya = 0}.
Equivalently, yI ∈ YI if
MyI = (. . . , wi, . . . , 0, 0)′,









. . . 0
0 0 q′
IA+1 · · · IA+1

.
9“IA+1”denotes the unit matrix of dimension A + 1.
10The matrix M is of dimension (I(S + 1) + A+ 1)× I(A + 1).
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The set of minimal effective feasible allocations of assets is 11 12
ŶI = {ŷI ∈ YI : 6 ∃yI ∈ YI , with sign(yI) = sign(ŷI), |yI| < |ŷI|}.
The set ŶI contains the effective feasible allocations of assets that are minimal: there
is no effective feasible allocation of assets such that at least one individual could attain the
same revenue plan with less trade, in absolute value, in at least one of the assets.
Since M need not have full column rank, the left - inverse of M may not exist.
By the singular value decomposition, there exist orthogonal matrices, U, of dimension
(I(S + 1) + A+ 1) × (I(S + 1) + A + 1), and V, of dimension I(A+ 1) × I(A+ 1), such
that 13 U ′MV = diag(σ1, . . . , σI(A+1)), and there is r such that the first r elements of
diag(σ1, . . . , σI(A+1)) are positive and the others are zero. The Moore - Penrose inverse of
M is defined by
M+ = VΣ+U ′,
where Σ+ = diag(1/σ1, . . . , 1/σr, 0, . . . , 0). If M has full column rank, then
M+ = (M ′M)−1M ′.
If yIR is such that y
I
R = M
+z, for some z, then yIR is an element in the row space of
M : z = MyIR, and y
I
R is the unique element of the row space of M with this property.
Lemma 1 The set, ŶI , of minimal effective feasible allocations of assets is bounded.
Proof If not, there exists a sequence, (yIn ∈ Ŷ
I : n = 1, . . .), such that ‖yIn‖∞ ≥ n. For
n = 1, . . . , wIn = (. . . , Ry
i
n, . . .)
′. Since Wi is compact, the sequence (wIn : n = 1, . . .) has
a convergent subsequence, denoted the same. The corresponding subsequence of (yIn ∈
ŶI : n = 1, . . .) is also denoted the same. Moreover, without loss of generality, sign(yIn) is










11“sign(x)”denotes the sign vector associated with the vector x; an element of sign(x) is 1, 0 or −1 if the
corresponding element of x is > 0, 0 or < 0, respectively.
12“|x|”denotes the absolute value vector associated with the vector x; an element of |x| is the absolute
value of the corresponding element of x.
13“diag(. . . , ak, . . .)”denotes the diagonal matrix of appropriate dimension with elements . . . , ak, . . . on
the diagonal.
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yIN,n : n = 1, . . .)
is well - defined and convergent, with limit yIN . Evidently, My
I





Moreover, yiN,a 6= 0 implies limn→∞ |y
i
a,n| = ∞, sign(y
i
a,n) > 0 implies y
i
N,a ≥ 0,
sign(yia,n) = 0 implies y
i
N,a = 0, and sign(y
i
a,n) < 0 implies y
i
N,a ≤ 0.
So, there exists n◦ such that for n ≥ n◦, sign(yIn − y
I
N ) = sign(y
I
n).


















Hence, for n ≥ n◦, yIn /∈ Ŷ
I , a contradiction. 2
It is surprising that, even with arbitrage possibilities or with payoffs of assets that are
linearly dependent, it is possible to restrict attention to a bounded set of possible sales and
purchases of assets.
Since ŶI is bounded, there exists α > 0, such that ‖yI‖∞ < α for all yI ∈ ŶI .
At a rationing scheme (z, z, y, y), the exact budget set, β̃i(z, z, y, y), of individual i is
the set of elements, (x, y) ∈ βi(p, q, z, z, y, y), that satisfy the budget constraint in every
state with equality: qy = 0 and ps(xs − eis) = Rs·y. The exact demand set, δ̃
i(z, z, y, y) of
the individual is the set of elements (x, y) ∈ β̃i(z, z, y, y) that maximize utility.
Non - emptiness of δi(p, q, z, z, y, y) implies non - emptiness of δ̃i(z, z, y, y), since the
utility function is weakly monotonically increasing in the numeraire commodity in every
state, where there are no rationing constraints. Nevertheless, δ̃i(z, z, y, y) can be a proper
subset of δi(p, q, z, z, y, y), since the utility function is not strictly monotonically increasing.
Lemma 2 The correspondence δ̃i is non - empty, compact and convex valued, and upper
hemi - continuous.
Proof For (z, z, y, y) ∈ Z × Z × Y × Y , the set β̃i(z, z, y, y) is non - empty: (ei, 0) ∈
β̃i(z, z, y, y), closed and convex. For (x, y) ∈ β̃i(z, z, y, y), −y
a
≤ ya ≤ ya, for a ∈ Ǎ, and
yA+1 = −
∑












and, thus, the asset demands are bounded. Moreover,
0 ≤ xl,s ≤ eil,s + zl,s, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,






l,s +Rs·y, s ∈ S,
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and it follows, from the boundedness of feasible asset demands, that the feasible spot
market demands are bounded as well; β̃i(z, z, y, y) is compact. By the continuity and quasi
- concavity of the utility function, δ̃i(z, z, y, y) is compact and convex.
If ((zn, zn, yn, yn) ∈ Z × Z × Y × Y : n = 1, . . .) is a sequence that converges to
(z, z, y, y), for any sequence ((xn, yn) ∈ δ̃i(zn, zn, yn, yn) : n = 1, . . .),
−y
a,n










and limn→∞(yn, yn) = (y, y); it follows that the sequence (yn : n = 1, . . .) is bounded.
Similarly, since
0 ≤ xl,s,n ≤ eil,s + zl,s,n, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,









the sequence ((zn, zn) : n = 1, . . .) is convergent, as is, as a consequence, the sequence
(xn : n = 1, . . .). It follows that ((xn, yn) : n = 1, . . .) has a convergent subsequence, also
denoted ((xn, yn) : n = 1, . . .), with limit (x̂, ŷ) ∈ β̃i(z, z, y, y).
If there exists (x̃, ỹ) ∈ δ̃i(z, z, y, y), such that ui(x̃) > ui(x̂), for L̃−, L̃+, Ã−, and Ã+,
the sets of non - numeraire commodities and non - numeraire assets, respectively, for which








, (l, s) ∈ L̃−,
znl,s
x̃l,s−eil,s




, a ∈ Ã−,
yna
ỹa
, a ∈ Ã+
}
,
n = 1, . . . ,
and
x̃n = ei + λn(x̃− ei), n = 1, . . .
ỹn = λnỹ, n = 1, . . . ,
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since













(x̃l,s − eil,s) = z
n




n(x̃l,s − eil,s) ≥ 0 ≥ z
n









(x̃l,s − eil,s) = z
n




n(x̃l,s − eil,s) ≤ 0 ≤ z
n







ỹa ≤ λnỹa = ỹna ≤ 0 ≤ y
n
a , a ∈ Ã−,
yn
a




ỹa = yna , a ∈ Ã+,
it holds that (x̃n, ỹn) ∈ β̃i(zn, zn, yn, yn). Moreover, x̃nl,s = (1 − λ
n)eil,s + λ
nx̃l,s ≥ 0, for
(l, s) ∈ L × S, and x̃n ≥ 0. Evidently, limn→∞ λn = 1, and limn→∞(x̃n, ỹn) = (x̃, ỹ). By
the continuity of the function ui, ui(x̃n) > ui(xn) for n sufficiently large, which contradicts
(xn, yn) ∈ δ̃i(zn, zn, yn, yn). Consequently, δ̃i is upper hemi - continuous. 2
The demand of individuals depends in an upper hemi - continuous way on the con-
straints they face in the markets of the non - numeraire assets and commodities. It is not
necessary to compactify consumption sets in order to get this result, even though there
are no restrictions whatsoever in the markets of the numeraire assets and the numeraire
commodities.
At a fix - price equilibrium ((z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)), in the market for commodity






l,s, so that the individual is
constrained on his supply in market (l, s), then by the definition of a fix - price equilibrium,




l,s. For a fixed



















l,s, so that the individual is constrained
on his demand in market (l, s), then no individual is constrained on his supply in market
























all a ∈ A — it is possible that ŷI = yI∗. This implies that (xi∗, ŷi) ∈ δ̃i(z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), for
every individual, and that ((z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, ŷI)) is a fix - price equilibrium.






that the individual is constrained in his supply in the market of asset a, then no individual is
constrained in his demand in the market of asset a : so ŷia < y
∗
a. Since, for every individual,
ŷia < α, if y
∗










a, so that the individual is constrained in his demand in the market of asset




for every individual, ŷia > −α, if y
∗
a
= −α, then ŷia > y
∗
a
, for every individual.
The state of the market of commodity (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S is described by rl,s ∈ [0, 1]. The
rationing scheme in commodities is then fully determined by a function 14 15
(ẑ, ẑ) : CLS → −RLS+ ×R
LS
+ .
If 0 ≤ rl,s ≤ 1/2, then there may be supply rationing in the market of commodity (l, s),
while demand rationing is excluded by putting ẑl,s(r) = ε + eal,s; if 1/2 ≤ rl,s ≤ 1, then
there may be demand rationing in the market of commodity (l, s), while supply rationing
is excluded by putting ẑl,s(r) = −ε− e
a
l,s.
The state of the market of asset a ∈ Ǎ is described by ρa ∈ [0, 1]. The rationing scheme
in assets is then fully determined by a function
(ŷ, ŷ) : CA → −RA+ ×R
A
+.
If 0 ≤ ρa ≤ 1/2, then there may be supply rationing in the market of asset a, while
demand rationing is excluded by putting ŷa(ρ) = α; if 1/2 ≤ ρa ≤ 1, then there may be




More precisely, the functions (ẑ, ẑ) and (ŷ, ŷ) are defined by




l,s}, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S, r ∈ C
LS ,
ẑl,s(r) = min{(2− 2rl,s)(ε+ eal,s), ε+ e
a




(ρ) = −min{2ρaα, α}, a ∈ Ǎ, ρ ∈ RA,
ŷa(ρ) = min{(2− 2ρa)α, α}, a ∈ Ǎ, ρ ∈ R
A,
14“RK”denotes the euclidean space of dimension K; “RK+ ”denotes the positive orthant and “R
K
++”the
strictly positive orthant; R1 = R, R1+ = R+, and R
1
++ =R++.
15“CK”denotes the unit cube: CK = {r ∈ RK : 0 ≤ rk ≤ 1}, of dimension K :
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for a fixed ε > 0.
The correspondences δ̂i, for all i, and ζ̂, with domain CLS × CA are defined by





The correspondence δ̂i, can be seen as a restriction of the correspondence δ̃i, with
rationing schemes being parametrized by the sets CLS and CA.
Lemma 3 If 0 ∈ ζ̂(r∗, ρ∗), then there exists (xi∗, yi∗) ∈ δ̂i(r∗, ρ∗), i ∈ I, such that
((ẑ(r∗), ẑ(r∗), ŷ(ρ∗), ŷ(ρ∗)), (xI∗, yI∗)) is a fix - price equilibrium of the economy.
Proof If (r∗, ρ∗) ∈ CLS × CA is such that 0 ∈ ζ̂(r∗, ρ∗), then there exists (xi∗, yi) ∈
δ̂i(ẑ(r∗), ẑ(r∗), ŷ(ρ∗), ŷ(ρ∗)), for all i, such that xa∗ = ea and ya = 0. There is a minimal
effective feasible allocation of assets yI∗ ∈ Ŷ, such that ya∗ = 0, and, for every individual,
Ryi∗ = Ryi, qyi∗ = qyi, sign(yi∗) = sign(yi), and |yi∗a | ≤ |y
i
a|, for all a. This implies that
(xi∗, yi∗) ∈ δ̃i(z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), for every individual, and that (1) and (2) of the definition of a
fix - price equilibrium are satisfied by ((z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)).



















∗), for every individual.





∗) for some i◦ ∈ I, then ẑl,s(r∗) ≤ xi
◦∗












∗), for every individual.
If for a ∈ Ǎ, yi
◦∗
a = ŷa(ρ
∗) for some i◦ ∈ I, then ŷ
a
(ρ∗) > −α since yi





∗) = α. It follows immediately that yi∗a (ρ
∗) < ŷa, for every individual.
If for a ∈ Ǎ, yi
◦∗
a = ŷa(ρ
∗) for some i◦ ∈ I, then ŷ
a
(ρ∗) < α since yi






(ρ∗) = −α. Again, it follows immediately that yi∗a (ρ
∗) > ŷ
a
, for every individual.
Hence, (3) is satisfied as well in the definition of a fix - price equilibrium. 2
The preparatory work is complete; it remains to show that there exists a zero point
of ζ̂ and thereby, a fix - price equilibrium. Since there is no rationing in the market
of the numeraire asset nor in the market of the numeraire commodities, existence of an
equilibrium is not obvious.
Proposition 3 A fix - price equilibrium exists.
Proof Since the correspondence δ̃i, for all i, is upper hemi - continuous and compact
valued, and the functions ẑ, ẑ, ŷ, and ŷ are continuous, it follows that δ̂i = δ̃i ◦ (ẑ, ẑ, ŷ, ŷ),
with domain CLS×CA, for all i, is a compact valued upper hemi - continuous correspondence,
and so ζ̂ is a compact valued upper hemi - continuous correspondence. It follows that the
set ζ̂(CLS × CA) is compact.
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The set Z is a compact, convex set that contains the projection on the first (L + 1)S
coordinates of the set ζ̂(CLS×CA); Y is a compact, convex set that contains the projection
on the last A+ 1 coordinates of the set ζ̂(CLS × CA). The correspondence µ : Z → CLS is
defined by
µ(z) = arg max{
∑
(l,s)∈Ľ×S
rl,szl,s : r ∈ C
LS, z ∈ Z};
the correspondence ν : Y → CA is defined by
ν(y) = arg max{
∑
a∈Ǎ
ρaya : ρ ∈ C
A, y ∈ Y};
the correspondence ϕ : Z ×Y × CLS × CA → Z ×Y × CLS × CA is defined by
ϕ(z, y, r, ρ) = ζ̂(r, ρ)× µ(z) × ν(y).
The correspondence ϕ is a non - empty, compact, convex valued, upper hemi - contin-
uous correspondence defined on a non - empty, compact, convex set. By Kakutani’s fixed
point theorem, ϕ has a fixed point, (z∗, y∗, r∗, ρ∗).
If, for some a ∈ Ǎ, y∗a < 0, then, by the definition of ν, ρ
∗
a = 0, and y
∗
a ≥ 0, a
contradiction.
If, for some a ∈ Ǎ, y∗a > 0, then, by the definition of ν, ρ
∗
a = 1, and y
∗
a ≤ 0, a
contradiction.







If, for some (l, s) ∈ Ľ× S, z∗l,s < 0, then, by the definition of µ, r
∗
l,s = 0, and z
∗
l,s ≥ 0, a
contradiction.
If, for some (l, s) ∈ Ľ× S, z∗l,s > 0, then, by the definition of µ, r
∗
l,s = 1, and z
∗
l,s ≤ 0, a
contradiction.









It follows that 0 ∈ ζ̂(r∗, ρ∗), and, hence, a fix - price equilibrium exists. 2
The conditions under which equilibrium existence can be shown are very weak. Of
particular interest is that endowments can be on the boundaries of the consumption sets of
individuals, and there is no restriction that the aggregate endowment of every commodity
be positive; this is of particular interest in a world with uncertainty, since one can imagine
states of nature in which certain commodities are fully unavailable.
4 Local Comparative Statics
The characterization of the local behavior requires that the economy be smooth:
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1. For every individual, the consumption set is X i = {x : x ≥ 0}; the utility function
is continuous and quasi - concave; in the interior of the consumption set 16, Int X i,
it is twice continuously differentiable, ∂ui  0 and ∂2ui is negative definite on 17
(∂ui)⊥; the endowment is strictly positive: ei ∈ Int X i, and ui(ei) > ui(x), for every
x ∈ Bd X i.
2. The matrix of payoffs of assets has full column rank. The numeraire asset, has
positive payoff: R·A+1 > 0.
In a smooth economy, the solution to the individual decision problem, di(p, q, z, z, y, y),
is unique, and the demand correspondence of an individual is a piece - wise continuously
differentiable function, di.
With convex consumtion sets and quasi - concave utility functions, if an individual is ef-
fectively rationed in his supply in the market for commodity (l, s), then dil,s(p, q, z, z, y, y)−
eil,s = zl,s, and, similarly, if the individual is effectively rationed in his demand in the mar-
ket for commodity (l, s), then dil,s(p, q, z, z, y, y)− e
i
l,s = zl,s. If an individual is effectively
rationed on his supply in the market for asset a, then dia(p, q, z, z, y, y) = ya, and, similar-
ly, if the individual is effectively rationed on his demand in the market for asset a, then
dia(p, q, z, z, y, y) = ya.
A sign vector is a vector with components −1, 0, 1.
The state of markets at a fix - price equilibrium is described by a sign vector
r = (. . . , rl,s, . . . , rL,s, . . . , ra, . . . , rA).
If there is effective supply rationing in the market for a commodity or an asset, the associ-
ated component of the sign vector is -1, if there is effective demand rationing it is +1, and
if there is no effective rationing it is 0.
For a sign vector r, the set PQ(r) is the set of prices (p, q) ∈ P × Q, for which there
exists a fix - price competitive equilibrium at prices (p, q) with state of the markets r.
For prices (p, q) ∈ P ×Q, the set of fix - price equilibrium allocations is D(p, q), and,
for a sign vector r, the set of fix - price equilibrium allocations with state of the markets r
is D(p, q, r).
Definition 5 (Local uniqueness) The allocation (xI∗, yI∗), at a competitive equilibrium,
((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)), is locally unique as a fix - price equilibrium allocation
if there exists a neighborhood, N xI∗,yI∗ , of (x
I∗, yI∗), such that, for every neighbourhood
NxI∗,yI∗ of (x
I∗, yI∗) that is contained in N xI∗,yI∗, there exists a neighbourhood, Np∗,q∗, of
(p∗, q∗), with the set D(p, q) ∩ NxI∗,yI∗ a singleton, for every (p, q) ∈ Np∗,q∗.
16“Int”denotes the interior of a set and “Bd”the boundary.
17“⊥”denotes the orthogonal complement.
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If a competitive equilibrium allocation is locally unique as a fix - price equilibrium
allocation, then, for prices close to competitive equilibrium prices, there is exactly one fix
- price equilibrium allocation close to the competitive allocation. Even if a competitive
equilibrium allocation is locally unique as a fix - price competitive equilibrium allocation,
variations in non - binding rationing schemes yield inessentially distinct fix - price equilibria.
The prices of numeraire commodities and of the numeraire asset are equal to one, so
neighbourhoods of prices are subsets of the domain P ×Q.
With a complete asset market, generically, the set of fix - price competitive equilibrium
allocations can be represented by a finite number of continuously differentiable functions
of prices and endowments — Laroque and Polemarchakis (1978). Nevertheless, under
standard assumptions, competitive equilibria are not locally unique as fix - price equilibria
— Laroque (1978), Madden (1982). Although fix - price equilibrium allocations exist for
all prices even with an incomplete asset market — proposition 3 — there may be robust
local non - existence at competitive prices. The equilibrium manifold has a particularly
complicated structure at competitive prices, which have lebesgue measure zero — as the
generic regularity of fix - price equilibria requires; the incompleteness of the asset market
does not alleviate the problem.
Local uniqueness of fix - price equilibrium allocations at competitive equilibria is not too
strong a requirement; given the upper hemi - continuity of the equilibrium correspondence,
it is less demanding than the requirement of uniqueness of fix - price equilibrium allocations,
which, in turn, is weaker than the requirements for stability.
Comparative statics require a differentiable form of local uniqueness.
Definition 6 (Differentiable local uniqueness) The allocation (xI∗, yI∗), at a compet-
itive equilibrium ((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)), is differentiably locally unique as a fix
- price equilibrium allocation if it is locally unique and there is a neighbourhood, Np∗,q∗,
of (p∗, q∗), and a neighbourhood NxI∗,yI∗ of (x
I∗, yI∗), such that, for every sign vector r,
the function (x̂r, ŷr) : Np∗,q∗ ∩ PQ(r) → RI(L+1)S+I(A+1), obtained by associating the u-
nique fix - price equilibrium allocation in NxI∗,yI∗ ∩D(p, q, r) to (p, q) ∈ Np∗,q∗ ∩PQ(r), is
differentiable 18.
For a locally unique fix - price competitive equilibrium allocation, the requirement
that it be differentiably locally unique is not very demanding; this is the case, since the
requirement of differentiability applies separately to different states of the markets.
The function (x̂, ŷ) : Np∗,q∗ →RI(L+1)S+I(A+1) is obtained by associating the unique fix
- price equilibrium allocation in NxI∗,yI∗ to (p, q) ∈ Np∗,q∗. The indirect utility function of
18A function with domain a subset of euclidean space which is not necessarily open is differentiable if it
has a differentiable extension to an open neighborhood of its domain of definition.
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an individual at a locally unique fix - price equilibrium is defined by
vi(p, q) = ui(x̂i(p, q)), (p, q) ∈ Np∗,q∗.
Lemma 4 At a differentiably locally unique competitive equilibrium allocation, for every
individual, the indirect utility function vi, with domain Np∗,q∗, is differentiable and
∂pl,sv
i(p∗, q∗) = −∂xL+1,su
i(xi∗)(xi∗l,s − e
i
l,s), (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S.
Proof For every sign vector, r, the restriction of the function vi to Np∗,q∗ ∩ PQ(r),
denoted vi
r
, is differentiable. From the differentiation of the budget constraints,
qŷi
r




s (p, q)− e
i
s) = Rs·ŷ
ir(p, q), s ∈ S,
























Since the derivative is independent of the sign vector, r, the result follows. 2
The effect of a change in the spot market price of commodity (l, s) ∈ Ľ×S is equal to
the negative of the marginal utility of the numeraire commodity in state s multiplied by
the excess demand of commodity (l, s) at the competitive equilibrium.
We analyse the local comparative statics of fix - price equilibria in the neighbourhood of
a competitive price system. This analysis follows Laroque (1978, 1981) for economies with
a complete asset market and leads to necessary and sufficient conditions for differentiable
local uniqueness.












l,s, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,




l,s, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,
y−a = mini y
i∗
a , a ∈ Ǎ,
y+a = maxi y
i∗
a , a ∈ Ǎ,
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determine the minimal and the maximal excess demands on both the spot and the asset
markets. If






l,s}, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,




l,s}, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,




a }, a ∈ Ǎ,
Ia = {i : yi∗a = y
+
a }, a ∈ Ǎ,
then in a neighbourhood of the competitive equilibrium, only individuals in I l,s may be
rationed on supply in the spot market (l, s), only individuals in Il,s on demand in the spot
market (l, s), only individuals in Ia on supply in the asset market a, and individuals in Ia
on demand in asset market a.
Lemma 5 Generically,
| I l,s |=| I l,s |= 1, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,
and
| Ia |=| Ia |= 1, a ∈ Ǎ.
Proof It follows from a standard transversality argument. 2
There is a generic set of economies, for which, there is exactly one individual in each
market with the minimal excess demand and exactly one individual with the maximal
excess demand; one restricts attention to this set, which does not include economies with
pareto optimal endowments.
At a competitive equilibrium, ((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)), N ixi∗,yi∗ is a neighbour-
hood of (xi∗, yi∗) with the property that, for every (xI, yI) ∈ NxI∗,yI∗ = ×i∈IN
i
xi∗,yi∗ , for













l,s, i 6= i













l,s, i 6= i
′, i′ ∈ Il,s
and, for all a ∈ Ǎ,
yi
′




a, i 6= i
′, i′ ∈ Ia
yi
′




a, i 6= i
′, i′ ∈ Ia.
In the optimization problem an individual faces when determining his demand for
commodities and assets, the lagrange multipliers corresponding to the rationing constraints
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in the markets for commodities are π = (. . . , πs, . . .), with πs = (. . . , πl,s, . . . , πL,s), and
the multipliers corresponding to the rationing constraints in the markets for assets are
ρ = (. . . , ρa, . . . , ρA).
At prices and lagrange multipliers (p, q, π, ρ) the modified demand correspondence d̂i






s.t. qy ≤ 0,
ps(xs − eis) ≤ Rs·y, s ∈ S.
Although the correspondence d̂i may have empty values, this is not the case in a neigh-
bourhood of (p∗, q∗, 0, 0); and it is single - valued, and, hence, a function, whenever it is
non - empty valued.
Lemma 6 Generically, at a competitive equilibrium, ((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗),
(xI∗, yI∗)), the function d̂i is continuously differentiable on an open neighbourhood Np∗,q∗,0,0
of (p∗, q∗, 0, 0).
Proof It follows from a standard transversality argument. 2
For every individual, the function ci : RLS ×RA → RLS ×RA is defined by
cil,s(π, ρ) =

πl,s, if πl,s ≤ 0 and i ∈ I l,s





ρa, if ρa ≤ 0 and i ∈ Ia
or ρa ≥ 0 and i ∈ Ia, a ∈ Ǎ,
0, otherwise.
It relates the lagrange multipliers, (π, ρ), to the fix - price equilibria in the neighborhood
of a competitive equilibrium.
The aggregate, modified excess demand function for commodities and assets other than
the numeraire, ẑa = (. . . , ẑal,s, . . . , ẑ
a
L,s, . . . , ẑ
a
a , . . . , ẑ
a
A), is defined, on the neighbourhood
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Np∗,q∗,0,0 of (p∗, q∗, 0, 0), by







ei, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,
and by




i(π, ρ)), a ∈ Ǎ.
For fix - price equilibria in the neighbourhood of a competitive equilibrium, it is suffi-
cient to restrict attention to the function ẑa.
Lemma 7 Generically, (xI, yI) ∈ D(p, q) ∩ N(xI∗,yI∗) if and only if there exists (π, ρ),
such that (p, q, π, ρ) ∈ Np∗,q∗,0,0, d̂i(p, q, ci(π, ρ)) = (xi, yi), for all i ∈ I, and ẑa(p, q, π, ρ) =
(0, 0).
Proof It follows from the first order conditions. 2
At a competitive equilibrium, the function ẑa vanishes: ẑa(p∗, q∗, 0, 0) = (0, 0). The
function ẑa is lipschitz continuous because of the differentiability of the functions d̂i, and
the lipschitz continuity of the functions ci, for every individual; it is differentiable at each
point (p, q, π, ρ) ∈ Np∗,q∗,0,0 where all components of π and ρ are non - zero. Lemma 7
establishes that fix - price equilibria in the neighbourhood of a competitive equilibrium,
are characterized by studying the zero points of ẑa.
For a sign vector r,
N rp∗,q∗,0,0 =
{(p, q, π, ρ) ∈ Np∗,q∗,0,0 : πl,srl,s > 0, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S, ρara > 0, a ∈ Ǎ}.
The function ẑa is differentiable on N rp∗,q∗,0,0. If no component of r is equal to zero, then
the limit of its jacobian, limn→∞ ∂ẑa(pn, qn, πn, ρn), along a sequence ((pn, qn, πn, ρn) ∈
N rp∗,q∗,0,0 : n = 1, . . .) that converges to (p
∗, q∗, 0, 0), exists and is denoted ∂ẑa
r

























∗, q∗, 0, 0) = ∂zaa(p
∗, q∗),
where za = (. . . , zal,s, . . . , z
a
L,s, . . . , z
a
a, . . . , z
a
A) denotes the unconstrained total excess de-
mand function for commodities and assets other than the numeraires, at a competitive
equilibrium, the jacobian with respect to (p̌, q̌) is independent of r.
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Proposition 4 If ((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)) is a competitive equilibrium and r is
a sign vector without zero, and if ∂z(p∗, q∗) is of full rank, then the tangent cone at (p∗, q∗)
to the set of price systems having a fix - price equilibrium with state of the markets r is
{(p, q) ∈ P ×Q : (p̌, q̌) = (∂z(p∗, q∗))−1∂π,ρẑa
r
(p∗, q∗, 0, 0)(π, ρ),
πl,srl,s > 0, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S, ρara > 0, a ∈ Ǎ}.
Proof The restriction of the function ẑa to N rp∗,q∗,0,0 extends to a differentiable func-
tion z̃a on Np∗,q∗,0,0 as follows: for i ∈ I, the function c̃i is defined by c̃il,s(π, ρ) = πl,s if
i ∈ I l,s and rl,s = −1 or i ∈ Il,s and rl,s = +1, or c̃
i
l,s = 0 otherwise and c̃
i
a(π, ρ) = ρa if
i ∈ Ia and ra = −1 or i ∈ Ia and ra = +1, and c̃
i
a(π, ρ) = 0, otherwise. The function
z̃a(. . . , z̃al,s, . . . , z̃
a
L,s, . . . , z̃
a
a , . . . , z̃
a
A) is defined by z̃
a












i(π, ρ)). Since ∂z(p∗, q∗) is of full rank, it fol-
lows by the implicit function theorem that the solution to z̃a(p, q, π, ρ) = (0, 0) determines
p and q as a function of π and ρ in a neighbourhood of (0, 0). The derivative of this function
at (0, 0) with respect to π and ρ is given by (∂za(p∗, q∗))−1∂π,ρz̃a(p∗, q∗, 0, 0). The expres-
sion in the proposition follows immediately if one takes into account that only π ’s and
ρ ’s satisfying πl,srl,s > 0, for all (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S, and ρara > 0, for all a ∈ Ǎ, should be
considered. 2
The assumption that ∂z(p∗, q∗) has full rank at every competitive equilibrium holds
generically — Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), proposition 2. Proposition 1 char-
acterizes the tangent cones to the regions in the price space having a fix - price equilibrium
with state of the markets r in the neighbourhood of a competitive equilibrium. It guar-
antees neither that the closures of these tangent cones cover the price space nor that the
tangent cones are full - dimensional nor that the tangent cones do not intersect. If this
were the case, one would have local uniqueness of the fix - price competitive equilibrium;
in fact, differentiable local uniqueness, since p and q are differentiable functions of π and
ρ, and the demand functions of individuals are differentiable as a function of p, q, π, and ρ
on Np∗,q∗,0,0. Even in the case of a complete asset market, the local uniqueness of the fix -
price equilibrium fails in robust examples — Madden (1982).
The function ẑa is lipschitz continuous. The generalized jacobian of a lipschitz con-
tinuous function, f, at a point, x, is the convex hull of all matrices that are the limits of
the sequence (∂f(xn) : n = 1, . . .), where (xn : n = 1, . . .) is a convergent sequence with
limn→∞ xn = x and f is differentiable at xn, n = 1, . . . .
If a function f is lipschitz continuous, f(x̂, ŷ) = 0, and every matrix M in ∂xf(x̂, ŷ) has
full rank, then there exist a neighbourhood, Nx̂,ŷ of (x̂, ŷ), a neighbourhood Nŷ of ŷ, and a
lipschitz continuous function, g, on Nŷ, such that (x, y) ∈ Nx̂,ŷ and f(x, y) = 0 if and only
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if y ∈ Nŷ and x = g(y)
19.
Proposition 5 If ((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (xI∗, yI∗)) is a competitive equilib- rium, and if
the determinants of the matrices ∂π,ρẑr(p∗, q∗, 0, 0), with r sign vectors without zero com-
ponents, are either all equal to −1 or all equal to +1, then the competitive equilibrium
allocation is differentiably locally unique as a fix - price equilibrium allocation.
Proof The generalized jacobian ∂π,ρẑa(p∗, q∗, 0, 0) is equal to the convex hull of the matri-
ces Mr = ∂π,ρẑa
r
(p∗, q∗, 0, 0), with r any sign vector without zero components. Moreover,
column (l, s) of such a matrix only depends on rl,s and column LS+a only on ra. Therefore,
any matrix M in ∂π,ρẑa(p∗, q∗, 0, 0) can be written as
(. . . , λl,sM
−
l,s + (1− λl,s)M
+
l,s, . . . , λL,sM
−
L,s + (1− λL,s)M
+
L,s,
. . . , λaM
−
a + (1− λa)M
+
a , . . . , λAM
−
A + (1− λA)M
+
A ),
with λl,s ∈ [0, 1], and λa ∈ [0, 1], for all a ∈ Ǎ, with M
−
l,s corresponding to column (l, s)
of a matrix Mr with rl,s = −1, M
+
l,s to column (l, s) of a matrix M
r with rl,s = +1, M−a
to column LS + a of a matrix Mr with ra = −1 and M+a to column LS + a of a matrix
















If, the sign of every det(Mr) is negative, then the sum is negative, whereas the sum is pos-
itive otherwise. So, M has full rank. By the extension of the implicit function proposition,
π and ρ are described as a lipschitz continuous function of p and q on a neighbourhood
of (p∗, q∗) to guarantee that ẑa(p, q, π, ρ) = (0, 0). Since fix - price competitive equilibria
are, locally, lipschitz continuous functions of (p, q), the competitive equilibrium is a local-
ly unique fix - price equilibrium. The implicit function theorem applied to the function
z̃a, as constructed in the proof of proposition 1 for any sign vector r without zero com-
ponents, yields that the competitive equilibrium is differentiably locally unique as a fix -
price competitive equilibrium. 2
There exist utility functions of individuals and matrices of payoffs of assets such that
the set of economies satisfying proposition 5 at all competitive equilibria is non - empty
and open.
Assumption 1 For every economy, ω ∈ Ω, every competitive equilibrium allocation is
differentiably locally unique as a fix - price equilibrium allocation.
19Laroque (1978, page 121), following Clarke (1976).
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As in Laroque (1981), whenever there are two sign vectors, r1 and r2, without zero
components such that the determinants of ∂π,ρẑa
r1
(p∗, q∗, 0, 0) and ∂π,ρẑa
r2
(p∗, q∗, 0, 0) have
opposite signs, and ∂za(p∗, q∗) has full rank, then, for every neighbourhood, NxI∗,yI∗ , of
(xI∗, yI∗), there exists, for every neighbourhood, Np∗,q∗, of (p∗, q∗), a price system, (p, q) ∈
Np∗,q∗, with at least two fix - price competitive equilibrium allocations in NxI∗,yI∗ : the
conditions in proposition 2 are “almost necessary.”
It is an open question whether the interior of the set of allocations of endowments
for which all competitive equilibrium allocations of the economy are differentiably locally
unique as fix - price equilibrium allocations can be empty.
5 Pareto Improving Price Regulation
Price regulation can pareto improve on a competitive equilibrium 20 ((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗),
(x∗, y∗)) if there exist prices of commodities, p, such that a fix - price equilibrium allocation
of commodities, x, at prices of commodities and assets (p, q∗) pareto dominates the allo-
cation x∗. The ambiguity introduced by the possibility of multiple fix - price equilibrium
allocations of commodities at prices (p, q∗) is circumvented by considering local variations
at competitive equilibria allocations that are differentiably locally unique as fix - price
equilibria.
Price regulation at competitive equilibrium prices p∗ is uniform if the deviation of prices
of commodities from their competitive equilibrium values, p∗s − ps, does not vary across
states of the world.
Definition 7 (Pareto improving price regulation) A competitive equilibrium,
((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (x∗, y∗))
can be pareto improved by price regulation if it is differentiably locally unique as fix - price
equilibrium and there exists an infinitesimal variation in the prices of commodities,




i(p∗, q∗)dpl,s > 0, i ∈ I.
A competitive equilibrium, can be pareto improved by uniform price regulation if it can
be pareto improved by price regulation with
dp̌s = dp̌s′ , s, s
′ ∈ S.
20The superscript I that indicates allocations is omitted in this section.
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Pareto improvement by price regulation is possible only if the competitive equilibrium
allocation is not pareto optimal, which is generically the case, and the asset market is
incomplete.
Assumption 2 A+ 1 < S.
Another necessary requirement is that the economy allows for heterogeneous individu-
als.
Assumption 3 I > 1.
The function ϕ is defined by
ϕ(x, λ̃, p̃, e) =

...






















where n 6= 0 is a fixed vector, such that nR = 0; prices of commodities, p̃, are discounted
prices, with only the price of commodity (L + 1, S) normalized to 1, and the lagrangian
multipliers , λ̃i, do not vary with the state of the world 21.
For e fixed, the function ϕe is defined by
ϕe(x, λ̃, p̃) = ϕ(x, λ̃, p̃, e).
Lemma 8 Generically, competitive equilibrium allocations are not pareto optimal.
Proof A necessary condition for x to be a pareto optimal competitive equilibrium allo-
cation for an economy, e, is that ϕe(x, λ̃, p̃) = 0.
Since the dimension of the domain of the function ϕe is lower than the dimension of the
range 22, whenever the function is transverse to 0, a solution to the equation ϕe(x, λ̃, p̃) = 0
does not exist.
21The dimension of the domain of the function ϕ is I(L+ 1)S+ I + (L+ 1)S− 1 + I(L+ 1)S, while the
dimension of the range is I(L+ 1)S + I + (L+ 1)S − 1 + I − 1,
22The dimension of the domain of the function ϕe, is I(L+ 1)S+ I + (L+ 1)S− 1, while the dimension
of the range is I(L+ 1)S + I + (L+ 1)S − 1 + I − 1.
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By a standard argument, the function ϕ is transverse to 0. By the transversal density
theorem 23, the set of economies for which the function ϕe is transverse to 0 has full lebesgue
measure; by assumption 1 and a standard argument, this set is open and, hence, generic.
2










i, i ∈ I, s ∈ S
...










a, a ∈ Ǎ
...





ξ = (x, λ, y, µ, p̌, q̌).
The vector ξ is restricted to the set Ξ defined by
Ξ = RI(L+1)S++ ×R
IS
++ ×R
I(A+1) ×RI × P̌ × Q̌.
The dimension of Ξ is denoted by N.
For fixed e, the function ψe is defined by 25
ψe(ξ) = ψ(ξ, e).
A competitive equilibrium, ((p∗, q∗), (z∗, z∗, y∗, y∗), (x∗, y∗)), is characterized by the nec-
essary and sufficient first order conditions
ψe(ξ
∗) = 0,
23Mas - Colell (1985 a), proposition 8.3.1, page 320.
24The dimension of the domain of the function ψ is I(L+1)S + IS+ I(A+1)+ I +LS+A+ I(L+1)S,
while the dimension of the range is I(L+ 1)S + IS + I(A + 1) + LS + A+ I.
25The dimension of the domain of the function ψe is I(L+ 1)S+ IS + I(A+ 1) + I +LS +A, while the
dimension of the range is I(L+ 1)S + IS + I(A + 1) + LS +A+ I.
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l,s, for (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S, and y
i∗
a
< yi∗a < y
i∗
a
, for a ∈ Ǎ.
The function h is defined by
















where α is a vector of dimension I.
A competitive equilibrium can be improved by means of price regulation if the matrix
of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to prices has full rank.
By lemma 4, this matrix is guaranteed to have full rank if there is no solution to the first
order conditions in combination with the equation
h(x, λ, α, e) = 0.
The function ψ̃ is defined by
ψ̃(ξ, α, e) =

ψ(ξ, e)
h(x, λ, α, e)
 .
For fixed e, the function ψ̃e is defined by 26
ψ̃e(ξ, α) = ψ̃e(ξ, α, e).
If the function ψ̃ is transverse to 0, then it follows from the transversal density theorem
that, for a subset of economies of full lebesgue measure, the function ψ̃e is transverse to 0.
Since the dimension of the range exceeds that of the domain, transversality of the function
ψ̃e implies that there are no solutions to the associated system of equations: it is possible
to pareto improve all competitive equilibria.
Proposition 6 If LS ≥ I, then, generically, all competitive equilibria can be pareto im-
proved by price regulation.
26The dimension of the domain of the function ψ̃e, is I(L+ 1)S+ IS+ I(A+ 1) + I +LS+A+ I, while
the dimension of the range is I(L+ 1)S + IS + I(A + 1) + LS + A+ I + LS + 1.
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Proof One fixes (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S and Ω∗, an open set of endowments of full measure, such
that no competitive equilibria of the associated economy E are pareto optimal.
The function g is defined by


















For fixed e, the function ψ̂e is defined by
ψ̂e(ξ) = ψ̂(ξ, e).
If (ξ, e) ∈ Ξ×Ω∗ is such that ψ̂(ξ, e) = 0, then the matrix, M̂ , of partial derivatives of
ψ̂ evaluated at (ξ, e) has full row rank: if v′M̂ = 0, then v = 0.
The components of v are denoted v1,i,l,s, i ∈ I, (l, s) ∈ L× S, v2,i,s, i ∈ I, s ∈ S, v3,i,a,
i ∈ I, a ∈ A, v4,l,s, (l, s) ∈ Ľ×S, v5,a, a ∈ Ǎ, v6,i, i ∈ I, and v9, according to the labelling
of the equations defining ψ̂.
If v is such that v′M̂ = 0, then 0 = v′∂eiL+1,sψ̂(ξ, e) = −v2,i,s, i ∈ I, s ∈ S, and, thus,
v2,i,s = 0, i ∈ I, s ∈ S.
It follows that, for i ∈ I,
0 = v′∂eil,s ψ̂(ξ, e) = −v4,l,s, (l, s) ∈ (Ľ \ {l})×S,
0 = v′∂ei
l,s




= 0, s ∈ S \ {s},
0 = v′∂ei
l
(s)ψ̂(ξ, e) = −v4,l,s.
Consequently, if v4,l,ŝ = 0 for some ŝ ∈ S\{s}, then v9 = 0 and v4,l,s = 0, for all s ∈ S\{s}.













, i, i′ ∈ I, s ∈ S \ {s}.






























Since ψ̂(ξ, e) = 0, the economy e has a pareto optimal competitive equilibrium induced
by ξ, contradicting e ∈ Ω∗. Consequently, v4,l,s = 0, s ∈ S \ {s}, and v9 = 0.
Summarizing,
v4,l,s = 0, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S,
v9 = 0.
For i ∈ I, for (l, s) ∈ L × S,




It is possible to represent a utility function satisfying assumption 1 by one with ∂2ui(xi)
negative definite on a bounded subset of the consumption set27. Therefore, without loss of
generality, ∂2ui(xi) is assumed to be negative definite, and, thus,
v1,i,l,s = 0, i ∈ I, (l, s) ∈ L × S.
For i ∈ I, 0 = v′∂yiA+1ψ̂(ξ, e) = v8,i, and, thus
v8,i = 0, i ∈ I.
Also, for a ∈ Ǎ, 0 = v′∂yiaψ̂(ξ, e) = v5,a, and, thus,
v5,a = 0, a ∈ Ǎ.




s·, i ∈ I, s ∈ S. Since R has full column rank,
v3,i,a = 0, i ∈ I, a ∈ Ǎ.
Therefore, v = 0, M̂ has rank full row rank, N + 1, and ψ̂ is transverse to 0. Moreover,
ψ̂ is continuously differentiable. If the set of endowments such that ψ̂e is transverse to
zero is Ω̂l,s, then, by the transversal density proposition, Ω
∗ \ Ω̂l,s has lebesgue measure
zero. For e ∈ Ω̂l,s, ψ̂e is a function from an N - dimensional C
∞ manifold into an (N + 1) -
dimensional C∞ manifold, ψ̂e ∈ C1(Ξ,RN+1), and ψ̂e is transverse to 0, so (ψ̂e)−1({0}) = ∅.
The same arguments can be repeated for every choice of (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S.
The set Ω̂ = ∩(l,s)∈Ľ×S Ω̂l,s is of full measure and, for e ∈ Ω̂, (ξ, e) is a solution to first











) 6= 0, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S.
By assumption 1 and a standard argument, Ω̂ is open with no loss of generality.
27Mas - Colell (1985 a), proposition 2.6.5, page 81.
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One restricts attention to economies e ∈ Ω̂.
For (ξ, α, e), such that ψ̃(ξ, α, e) = 0, M̃ is the matrix of partial derivatives of ψ̃
evaluated at (ξ, α, e).
If v is such that v′M̃ = 0, and components of v are denoted by v1,i,l,s, v2,i,s, v3,i,a, v4,l,s,
v5,a, v6,i, v7,l,s, and v8, then,
0 = v′∂ei
L+1,s
ψ̃(ξ, α, e) = −v2,i,s, i ∈ I, s ∈ S.
Hence,
0 = v′∂eil,s ψ̃(ξ, α, e) = −v4,l,s− α




i)2 = 1, there is i′ such that αi
′
6= 0. If there is s ∈ S such that, for





































































iλis)v7,l,s = 0, so v7,l,s = 0, and, thus v4,l,s = 0.
Also, 0 = v′∂αi′ ψ̃(ξ, α, e) = 2α
i′v8, so, since αi
′
6= 0, v8 = 0. It follows as in the first
part of the proof that v1,i,l,s = 0, i ∈ I, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S, that v6,i = 0, i ∈ I, that v5,a = 0,
a ∈ Ǎ, and that v3,i,a = 0, i ∈ I, a ∈ A.
Therefore, M̃ has rank N + LS + 1 and ψ̃ intersects 0 transversally; ψ̃ is continuously
differentiable.
If Ω̃ is the set of economies such that ψ̃ is transverse to 0, Ω̂ \ Ω̃ has lebesgue measure
zero. Without loss of generality, Ω̃, is an open set.
The set Ω∗ ∩ Ω̃ is open and of full lebesgue measure. For every economy in Ω∗ ∩ Ω̃, the
matrix of partial derivatives of the indirect utility function, evaluated at any competitive
equilibrium is invertible; which implies that there is a price regulation effecting a pareto
improvement. 2
A competitive equilibrium can be pareto improved by uniform price regulation if the
matrix of partial derivatives of the indirect utility functions with respect to uniform price
regulation has full rank.
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The function k is defined by
k(ξ, α, e) =

∑





where α is a vector of dimension I.
By lemma 4, this matrix is guaranteed to have full rank if there is no solution to the
first order conditions for a competitive equilibrium augmented by the equations
k(ξ, α, e) = 0.
Proposition 7 If L ≥ I, then, generically, all competitive equilibria can be pareto im-
proved by uniform price regulation.
Proof The argument follows that in the proof of proposition 6. The equations that char-
acterize pareto optimality are replaced by the equations that characterize pareto improving
regulation to define a function ψ̃; the matrix M̃ gives the partial derivatives of ψ̃ evaluated
at some (ξ, α, e) with ψ̃(ξ, α, e) = 0. If v′M̃ = 0, by considering the partial derivatives with
respect to eil,s, it follows that
v2,i,s = 0, i ∈ I, s ∈ S,
v4,l,s + αiλisv7,l = 0, i ∈ I, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S.
If i′ is such that αi
′





iλis = 0, then, for












































which contradicts e ∈ Ω̂. It follows that v4,l,s = 0, (l, s) ∈ Ľ × S, and v7,l = 0, l ∈ Ľ. The
remainder of the proof follows the argument in the proof of proposition 6. 2
Uniform price regulation is effective when L ≥ I ; it complements the constrained sub-
optimality result of Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986), which applies when I ≥ 2L.
6 An Example
There are two individuals: I = {1, 2}, three states of the world : S = {1, 2, 3}, two
commodities: L = {1, 2}, with commodity 2 the numeraire at every state of the world,
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and two assets: A = {1, 2}, with asset 2 the numeraire in the market for assets. The
utility function of individual i over strictly positive consumption of commodity 1 and





s, with state dependent cardinal utility
uis(xs) = α
i




s > 0, β
i
s > 0,
and a strictly positive probability measure, (. . . , πs, . . .), over the states of the world; the
endowment of the individual, ei is strictly positive.
The payoffs of assets, denominated in the numeraire commodity, are R·1 = (0, 1, 1)′,
and R·2 = (1, 0, 0)′, respectively.
The payoffs of assets allow for the following interpretation: consumption at state of
the world 1 is concurrent with the trade in assets, while the only asset available, traded
against consumption, is an indexed bond, with state - independent payoffs.
The price of the commodity other than the numeraire at each state of the world is ps;
across states of the world, p = (. . . , ps, . . .). The price of the asset other than the numeraire
is q.
Rationing on the supply or demand of commodity 1 at state of the world s is zs, or zs,
respectively, and rationing on the supply or demand of asset 1 is y or y, respectively.







































































: s = 2, 3
}
,
which eliminates equilibria at the boundaries of their consumption sets28.
28A possible choice of parameters is, for instance,


































e11 = (1, 1)
′, e12 = (1, 1)
′, e13 = (2, 1)
′,
e21 = (1, 1)
′, e22 = (2, 1)
′, e23 = (1, 1)
′.
In fact, αis, β
i
s, and πs, are chosen to coincide with π. There is, then a full dimensional set of parameters e
i
1,s
ans ei2,s that satisfy the parameter restrictions: it suffices that e
i
2,s be sufficiently large for every individual,
at every state of the world.
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+ yi∗, i = 1, 2, s = 2, 3,













, i = 1, 2,











, i = 1, 2, s = 2, 3,







s, i = 1, 2, s = 1, 2, 3,
y∗ < yi∗ < y∗, i = 1, 2,
where i′ 6= i. After the choice of x1∗, x2∗, y1∗ and y2∗, any choice of a non - binding rationing
scheme yields an equilibrium. Owing to the linearity of utility in the amount consumed
of the numeraire commodity in each state, the demand for the numeraire commodities is
not uniquely determined in equilibrium. There is a trade - off between more consumption
of the numeraire commodity in state 1 and an amount of consumption of the numeraire
commodity in both states 2 and 3. The utility level of individuals is the same for all
competitive equilibria.
Fix - price equilibrium exist for all prices of commodities, p, and prices of assets q = 1
π
.

















































(i) If 0 < ps ≤ γis/e
i
1,s, both individuals have an excess demand for commodity 1.
















i∗, yi∗ ≤ πei2,1, and y
i∗ ≥ −πei
′









i∗, yi∗ ≥ −ei2,s, and y
i∗ ≤ ei
′
2,s. The remaining parameters of
the rationing scheme are set so as not to be binding.
(ii) If γis/e
i








1,s), there is aggregate excess demand for com-
modity 1, but individual i supplies the commodity, and trade takes place, with individual








































































s. The remaining parameters of the rationing scheme are set so
as not to be binding.










1,s, there is aggregate excess supply of com-
modity 1, and individual i supplies the commodity, rationed by the demand of individual










































































s . The remaining parameters of the rationing scheme are set so





1,s ≤ ps, both individuals supply commodity 1, are fully rationed on their

















yi∗ ≤ πei2,1, and y
i∗ ≥ −πei
′










i∗, yi∗ ≥ −ei2,s,
and yi∗ ≤ ei
′
2,s. The remaining parameters of the rationing scheme are set so as not to be
binding.
The utility attained by each individual at a fix - price competitive equilibrium is unam-
biguously determined by the prices of commodities; if they coincide with the competitive
equilibrium prices, the equilibrium allocations of commodities and the utility attained by
each individual coincide as well. At competitive equilibrium prices of commodities, the
















































































































































































































Substitution of the competitive equilibrium prices in either case (ii) or case (iii) yields
the utility levels at the competitive equilibrium. Moreover, the indirect utility function is





























































Indeed, substitution of the competitive price system in either (ii) or (iii) yields the same










































































If the matrix V has full row rank, price regulation can pareto improve the competitive
equilibrium allocation.














for the matrix V to have full row rank it is sufficient that vs 6= 0, for every state of the world.






s , generically in the endowments of individuals
it is possible to pareto improve on the competitive allocation 29. This is also the essence of
proposition 6; only here, because of linear utility in the numeraire commodity, variations
in endowments do not affect the marginal utilities of income at equilibrium and an ad hoc
argument is required.











Individual 1 demands commodity 1 in state 2 and therefore benefits from a decrease in the price of
commodity 1 in state 2, and supplies commodity 1 in state 3 and therefore benefits from an increase in
the price of commodity 1 in state 3. For individual 2 the utility effects are reversed. For individual 1 the
marginal utility of income is higher in state 2, the state in which he has low endowment, than in state 3,
where he has high endowments, and vice versa for individual 2. A decrease of the price of commodity 1
in state 2 leads to an increase of utility for individual 1 which exceeds the loss in utility of individual 2,
and a decrease of the price of commodity 1 in state 3 leads to an increase of utility for individual 2 which
exceeds the loss in utility of individual 1. Both individuals benefit if the price of commodity 1 in states 2
and 3 is fixed below its competitive equilibrium value. A pareto improvement can even be achieved by a
uniform price regulation, although this is not necessarily the case if L < I.
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Since L < I, it is not always possible to pareto improve on the competitive equilibrium
by a uniform price regulation. A pareto improvement by a uniform price regulation may










3v3 have opposite signs. This is by no
means excluded. That uniform price regulation may fail in this example to achieve pareto
improvements is not surprising, since in general, it is not possible to attain I goals by only
L < I instruments.
7 Conclusion
Given any prices for commodities and assets, a competitive allocation of resources exists
under weak assumptions, but does in general involve endogenously determined amounts
of rationing. Under such circumstances it is possible for individuals to hold arbitrage
portfolios in equilibrium, which is rather counterintuitive since markets are transparent
and constraints on trade are endogenously determined.
Local comparative statics are complicated at competitive equilibrium prices. Arbitrarily
small deviations from competitive prices may lead to discontinuous jumps in allocations and
utilities. Necessary and sufficient conditions for local existence of fix - price equilibria in the
neighborhood of competitive equilibria are derived. Provided those conditions hold, price
regulation offers opportunities for efficiency gains when asset markets are incomplete and
risk sharing is restricted. This conclusion does not change when uniform price regulation
is considered only.
A serious concern are the informational requirements needed to determine, even com-
pute, improving interventions. In the case of price regulation they involve knowledge of
marginal utilities of income and excess demands for commodities across states. The char-
acterization in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1990) and in Kübler and Polemarchakis
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